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THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LITIGATION:
AD/CVD LITIGATION - WHICH FORUM
AND WHICH LAW?
Elizabeth C. Seastrum*
Myles S. Getlan**
I. INTRODUCTION
Litigation of antidumping and countervailing duty deter-
minations is becoming increasingly complex-and increasingly
interesting-due to the possibility that agency decisions will be
reviewed before various fora and the varying array of applica-
ble laws. In addition to traditional judicial review before the
United States Court of International Trade ("CIT"), the fora
include binational panels under Chapter 19 of the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")' and international
panels convened under the dispute settlement rules of the
World Trade Organization ("WTO").2 While the law which
these bodies may apply in reviewing agency Anti-Dumping
Agreement ("AD") or Countervailing Duty Determinations
("CVD") decisions is similar in its general scope, it may vary
considerably with regard to significant details. Thus, litigants
will think carefully about which forum, and which law, will
* Senior Counsel for Litigation, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Ad-
ministration, Office of the General Counsel, United States Department of Com-
merce. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the views
of the Department. The authors wish to express their appreciation to Marc
Bernstein, senior attorney at the U.S. International Trade Commission, for his
review of this paper.
** Senior Associate, Miller & Chevalier, Washington, D.C. While writing this
article, Mr. Getlan was an attorney (International), with the Office of the Chief
Counsel for Import Administration, Office of the General Counsel, United States
Department of Commerce. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily
represent the views of the Department.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, ch. 19, 32 I.L.M.
682 [hereinafter NAFTA.
2. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUiENTS-RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSUI.
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apply in the course of proceedings which they may choose to-or
be compelled to-pursue.
This paper will examine a hypothetical antidumping case
involving soccer bounce-balls from Mexico to analyze which
forum and which law is most appropriate for the litigants.
Section II sets forth the hypothetical. Section III details the
litigants' response to the agency's preliminary determination
and Section IV outlines the final determination. Finally, Sec-
tion V describes the parties' post-litigation options.
II. INITIATION
The U.S. Department of Injury, Dumping, and Subsidies
("DIDS") initiates an antidumping investigation against soccer
bounce-balls from Mexico. The Mexican soccer balls are made
of a new, high-tech, flubber-like substance which conforms to
the body (e.g., head or foot) upon impact, so as to diminish
bodily injury, yet recovers its prior shape and rebounds from
the body with a 30% increase in power and velocity. The new
"bounce-balls" cost about the same as traditional soccer balls
and are taking the U.S. market by storm. Soccer authorities
are in a tizzy as to whether the bounce-balls may be autho-
rized for use in regulation games.
The petitioners for the antidumping duties are U.S. soccer
ball producers, allegedly representing all domestic production.
There are no U.S. bounce-ball producers, so far as the petition-
ers know. Nevertheless, to be sure, DIDS takes out a full-page
advertisement in Soccer America, asking if there are any U.S.
bounce-ball producers and, if so, requesting that they come
forward and express their views on the merits of the petition.
DIDS receives no response and initiates an investigation.
In its initiation notice, DIDS defines soccer balls as the
domestic like product because it finds that soccer balls are the
domestically produced product most similar in characteristics
and uses with the imported bounce-balls. DIDS, therefore, de-
termines that the U.S. industry producing soccer balls has the
requisite industry support to bring a case against the produc-
ers of Mexican bounce-balls.
Meanwhile, the telephones of the Mexican respondents
have been ringing off the hook since DIDS published its ads; as
U.S. importers of the Mexican product call furiously to deter-
mine what their dumping liability will be and threaten to stop
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importing. The Mexican producers are irate at the initiation
and push their lawyers and government to stop the case imme-
diately, in any legal manner possible.
A. After Initiation, What Do the Litigants Do, If Anything, In
What Forum, and Why?
1. Mexican Bounce-Ball Producers
The Mexican bounce-ball producers-respondents in the
newly initiated antidumping investigation-want to stop the
investigation immediately. Their lawyers advise them that
DIDS probably has acted illegally in one respect and is on
shaky legal grounds in a second regard. They may have a rem-
edy in the CIT, in the form of injunctive relief, as discussed
below.
With regard to the possible illegality of DIDS' initiation,
the Mexican respondents first claim that DIDS violated both
the WTO Antidumping Agreement3 and the U.S. statute4 by
publicizing the filing of the antidumping petition in a well-
known sports magazine. The AD Agreement specifically re-
quires that investigating "authorities shall avoid, unless a
decision has been made to initiate an investigation, any publi-
cizing of the application for the initiation of an investigation."'
The U.S. statute states that the administering authority "shall
not accept any unsolicited oral or written communications"
from any person other thd.n specified domestic interested par-
ties, except when polling the industry to determine if there is
sufficient industry support for the petition.6
3. Agreement on Implementation of Art. VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Agreement or AD].
4. The hypothetical DIDS is subject to all United States laws.
5. AD, supra note 3, at art. 5.5. An exception to the no-publication rule prior
to initiation exists for governments. Article 5.5 requires the investigating authority
to notify the government of the exporting country concerned, after receipt of a
properly documented application (petition).
6. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673a(b)(3)(B), (c)(4)(D) (1994). See also Comments to Fi-
nal Antidumping Regulations, § 351.202 (concerning pre-initiation communications,
Antidumping Duties, and Countervailing Duties); Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 27,296,
27, 305-306 (May 19, 1997). See generally URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS,
TExTS OF AGREEMENTS, IMPLEMENTING BILL, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE Ac-
TION, AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R. DOC. No. 103-316 at 861
BROOK. J. INTL L.
Second, the Mexican respondents contend that the DIDS
"like product" determination-that soccer balls are similar in
characteristics and uses with the imported bounce-balls-is
unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence of record. The
clearly superior Mexican bounce-ball could never be considered
in the same category as a run-of-the-mill U.S. soccer ball, sat-
isfying the definition of "domestic industry" under Article 4.1 of
the AD Agreement.' That definition refers to the "domestic
producers as a whole of the like product."' It further defines
"like product" in Article 2.6 as "a product which is identical,
i.e., alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or
in the absence of such a product, another product which al-
though not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely
resembling those of the product under consideration."9 The
U.S. statute has a similar definition.'" Because the U.S. soc-
cer ball producers do not produce a product sufficiently "like"
the Mexican bounce-balls for which they are seeking
antidumping duties, the Mexican respondents contend that the
U.S. producers lack standing to pursue the case and it must be
dismissed.
Procedurally, the Mexican respondents urge their lawyers
to seek an immediate halt to what they view as an unjust and
illegal DIDS investigation, before it plays further havoc with
their exports to the United States and their business and mar-
keting plans. In which forum may they seek such a halt? The
attorneys advise against the WTO, where the dispute settle-
ment rules generally limit cases to those challenging final
agency actions." Nevertheless, the Mexican companies press
(1994) [hereinafter SAA (stating that Commerce and the International Trade Com-
mission (ITC) are to avoid publicizing the existence of a petition before initiation
and shall not issue press releases during this period).
7. See AD, supra note 3, at art. 4.1.
8. Id.
9. Id. at art. 2.6.
10. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1) (1994) (explaining that a petition to initiate an
antidumping investigation may be initiated by an interested party who files a
petition "on behalf of an industry."). That interested party is defined as a produc-
er, or other group, of a "domestic like product," which is in turn defined as "a
product which is like, or in the absence of like, most similar in characteristics and
uses with, the article subject to an investigation under this subtitle." Id. §§
1677(9)(C-G), (10).
11. See AD, supra note 3, at art. 17.4 (limiting dispute settlement to a final
action by the administering authority or to action imposing provisional measures
under certain circumstances). This provision does not allow cases against initiation
896 [Vol. =XV:3
20011 AD/ CVD LITIGATION 897
their own government to do something. 2
Chapter 19 of the NAFTA also limits panel review to final
agency determinations, so that is not a viable forum. 3 Simi-
larly, judicial review in the CIT of DIDS determinations is
enumerated in great detail, and. does not include affirmative
initiation decisions.'4 Nevertheless, the Mexican respondents
decide to try their luck in the CIT, seeking interlocutory re-
view under the court's "residual jurisdictional" authority. 5
Under this authority, interested parties may obtain "back door"
judicial review of DIDS determinations if they can convince the
court that the routine review procedures would be "manifestly
inadequate" as applied to their case. 6 In addition, unlike
WTO and NAFTA panels, the CIT has the equitable power
necessary to enjoin an agency from further proceedings. 7 Of
course, the Mexican respondents believe the court must review
the illegal initiation and immediately exercise its equitable
powers to enjoin DIDS from continuing its unjust antidumping
investigation. Thus, they instruct their attorneys to file the
necessary papers in the CIT as soon as possible.
The Mexican respondents' attorneys proceed with the re-
quest for injunctive relief before the CIT, although they advise
of an anti-dumping investigation, at the time of the initiation. Initiation decisions
may be challenged in the context of a challenge to the authority's final determi-
nation. See infra note 49. See also Guatemala - Anti-dumping Investigation Re-
garding Portland Cement From Mexico, WT/DS60R, Report of the Panel, circulated
June 19, 1998 [hereinafter Guatemala Cement], and WT/DS60/AB/R, Report of the
Appellate Body, circulated Nov. 2, 1998 [hereinafter Appellate Report].
12. Only member governments, not private parties, may pursue cases in the
WTO under the dispute settlement scheme. See DSU, supra note 2, at arts. 1
(Coverage and Application), 3 (General Provisions), and 10 (Third Parties). See also
AD, supra note 3, at art. 17 (Consultation and Dispute Settlement).
13. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 19, at art. 1904 (referring only to review of
"final" AD or CVD determinations). Article 1911 and Annex 1911 define "final de-
termination" as it applies to the United States; this does not include initiations.
See id. at art. 1911, Annex 1911.
14. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (1994). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1994). In
contrast, judicial review of negative initiation decisions is allowed. 19 U.S.C. §
1516a(a)(1)(A) (1994).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
16. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 824 F.2d 961 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See also
Pulton Chain Co. v. United States, 17 Ct. Int'l Trade 1136, 1139 (1993);
Technoimportexport v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 1169, 1175 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1991); Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 1466, 1475 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1997).
17. The CIT is an Article III court, with the same powers of law and equity
as conferred upon the U.S. district courts. 28 U.S.C. §§ 251(a), 1585 (1994).
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their clients that their chance of success is limited. Even if
they can convince the court to exercise its residual jurisdiction
over such an interlocutory appeal, they will face an uphill
battle in proving that their clients are sufficiently harmed to
merit the extraordinary relief of an injunction to halt the
agency's action. 8 In addition, their claims on the merits re-
garding pre-initiation publication and like product under the
U.S. statute are not necessarily winners. They would prefer to
be in the WTO on the pre-initiation claim, but an appeal there
is premature. The CIT will, of course, apply the U.S. statute,
whereas a WTO panel will apply strictly WTO rules. 9 Never-
theless, the Mexican bounce-ball producers are hopping mad
and want action. They also are flush with cash from their
highly successful product and willing to bankroll aggressive
action to protect the lucrative U.S. market. Because the Mexi-
can respondents' attorneys believe that their case is within the
bounds of law, they prepare and file the appropriate papers
with the CIT.
2. DIDS
DIDS attorneys are well prepared when they receive the
papers requesting a temporary restraining order and prelimi-
nary injunction against their agency, as filed in the CIT by the
Mexican respondents. They have argued against such motions
many times and immediately oppose the temporary restraining
order ("TRO") request and move to dismiss the action on the
grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction over this interlocutory
appeal. The Mexican respondents will have a full opportunity
18. The mere inconvenience and cost of defending against an AD or CVD
investigation or review is not, in itself, sufficient to constitute the irreparable
harm required to obtain injunctive relief. "[Wlithout more, harm attributable to
participating in an unauthorized antidumping proceeding is not sufficient to render
the remedy afforded by 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) manifestly inadequate." Hylsa, S.A. de
C.V. v. United States, 960 F. Supp. 320, 324 (Ct. Intl Trade 1997) (citations omit-
ted), affd 135 F.2d 778 (Fed. Cir. 1998); accord Fed. Trade Comm'n. v. Standard
Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980) (rejecting argument that expenses and disruption
of participating in adjudicatory proceedings claimed to be invalid justifies judicial
review prior to a final agency determination). See also Miller, 824 F.2d at 964
("mere allegations of financial harm, or assertions that an agency failed to follow a
statute, do not make the remedy established by Congress manifestly inadequate")
(citing Am. Air Parcel Forwarding v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1550-51 (Fed.
Cir. 1983)).
19. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
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to press their points at the end of the investigation when they
may appeal under the prescribed statutory regime-either to
the CIT or to a Chapter 19 NAFTA panel." It is premature to
allow their appeal now; all parties will benefit from a full air-
ing and investigation of the issues before the agency, which
will have an opportunity to explain, in detail, the reasons for
its views in its final determination.2'
Moreover, DIDS attorneys are confident that, as to the
merits of their action, the pre-initiation publication of the peti-
tion is allowable under the U.S. statutory exception for polling
the industry, and the agency's like product call for the bounce-
balls was imminently reasonable on the record as compiled. In
short, DIDS attorneys are optimistic that they will get the
Mexican case tossed out of the CIT. If not, and the CIT enjoins
the agency from continuing its investigation, DIDS will appeal
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing
that the CIT improperly asserted jurisdiction and improperly
granted injunctive relief. Nevertheless, DIDS attorneys are
concerned that their client may be vulnerable to an eventual
WTO attack on the pre-initiation publication of the petition
because the AD Agreement contains no explicit polling excep-
tion, even though the action which DIDS took ensured a more
thorough examination of the industry support issue. DIDS will
not re-visit its standing call made at initiation, as this is pro-
hibited by the U.S. statute.' It is not, however, prohibited by
the AD Agreement.
3. U.S. Soccer Ball Producers
The U.S. soccer ball producers-petitioners in the
antidumping investigation-also oppose the Mexican bounce-
ball producers' motion for injunctive relief in the CIT. They
intervene on the side of DIDS. At the hearing before the court
on the injunction, they present particularly persuasive evi-
dence, including witnesses, and do an effective job of cross-
examining the respondents' witnesses. They play up the incon-
20. See NAFTA, supra note 1.
21. This preserves the statutory scheme designed by Congress, "absent which
litigants could ignore the precepts of subsections (a)-(h) [of § 1581(i)] and immedi-
ately file suit in the Court of International Trade under subsection i)."
Norcal/Crossetti Foods, Inc. v. United States, 963 F.2d 356, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
22. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(4)(E) (1994).
2001] 899
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sistency in the Mexicans' argument of irreparable harm at
being shut out of the U.S. soccer ball market, when at the
same time they claim that their product is radically different
from the traditional soccer ball.
4. Mexican Government
The Mexican Government-in particular, DIDS' counterpart
in SECOFI-is apprised of the initiation but takes no part in
the litigation in the U.S. court. However, at the request of the
bounce-ball producers, their embassy in Washington, D.C.
sends a letter to the Secretary of DIDS, expressing opposition
to the investigation and requesting a meeting with the Secre-
tary, Under Secretary, or Assistant Secretary. The meeting is
held and the DIDS officials promise to continue to act consis-
tently with U.S. domestic law and international obligations. In
addition, the Mexican Government requests consultations un-
der the aegis of the WTO. While the U.S. Government express-
es its view that such consultations are premature under any
WTO procedure, it nevertheless agrees to general consultations
in Geneva, although not under any WTO dispute settlement
procedure.
III. PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION
The CIT declines to exercise its residual jurisdiction over
the Mexican bounce-ball producers' attempt at interlocutory
appeal and dismisses the case. DIDS then proceeds with its
antidumping investigation, finds a reasonable indication of
injury,' and issues a preliminary affirmative dumping deter-
mination, with margins of 70%.
23. Secretaria de comercio y fomento industrial (Secretary of Commerce and
Industrial Development) is the agency of the Mexican Government responsible for
its AD/CVD program.
24. The hypothetical DIDS performs the investigative functions of the U.S.
International Trade Commission with regard to injury findings. See 19 U.S.C. §§
1673b(a) (preliminary injury determination) and 1673d(b) (final injury determina-
tion) (1994).
900 [Vol. =XV:3
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A. After the Preliminary Determination, What Do the Litigants
Do, If Anything, In What Forum, and Why?
1. Mexican Bounce-Ball Producers
With issuance of the DIDS preliminary determination,
trade in Mexican bounce-balls to the United States is effective-
ly halted because the U.S. Customs Service suspends liquida-
tion on entries of the product and requires bonds at the DIDS
estimated dumping rate of 70% of the ad valorem value of the
productsY The Mexican companies are outraged and again
urge their lawyers to take all possible action to stop the inves-
tigation and remove the prohibitively high bonds. The lawyers
advise them against seeking injunctive relief in the CIT again
in the wake of their dismissal at the initiation stage. While
arguably their harm is more acute than ever, because steep
margins have been found, case precedent in the court is strong-
ly against them.26 They consider appealing to the Federal Cir-
cuit the CIT's dismissal of their challenge to the initiation, but
decide that events are proceeding too quickly and that they
instead will marshal their resources and fight the investiga-
tion.
They also consider seriously a challenge to the preliminary
determination in the WTO. The AD Agreement allows such
interlocutory suits, provided that the piovisional measure has
a "significant impact."27 In the Mexicans' view, a shut-out
dumping rate has a "significant impact." Accordingly, they urge
their government to challenge the preliminary determination
in the WTO on the same substantive grounds as their chal-
lenge to the initiation in the CIT. Even so, they feel frustrated
by their inability to get strong, swift action against DIDS. The
WTO challenge will not move as quickly as would a suit for
25. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d) (1994).
26. Challenges to affirmative (or negative) AD/CVD preliminary determinations
are not among the determinations enumerated in 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (1994), as
reviewable in the CIT or before a NAFTA panel.
27. See AD, supra note 3, at art. 17.4 (stating that, "[wihen a provisional
measure has a significant impact and the Member considers the measure was
taken contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 7 of this Agreement,
that member may also refer such matter to the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body].").
Paragraph 1 of Article 7 enumerates and cross-references the basic requirements
for an AD suit, including a proper initiation pursuant to Article 5 of the Agree-
ment. See id. at art. 7.
20011 901
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injunctive relief in the CIT,28 and the WTO panels do not pos-
sess retroactive powers. 9 They are empowered to "examine
the matter" and "recommend" that the offending government
"bring the measure into conformity" with the Agreement. 0
Nevertheless, the Mexican producers urge their government to
begin a WTO challenge to the DIDS preliminary determina-
tion; even if only to signal to DIDS how seriously any final
determination will be viewed.
2. DIDS
Busy DIDS attorneys are somewhat irritated, although
only partly surprised, when they receive the papers from Mexi-
co stating that it has requested WTO consultations on the
preliminary determination. Rather than traveling to Geneva
again, however, the two governments agree to save time and
resources by conducting their consultations via video
conferencing. This works well, and at the consultations DIDS
expresses the U.S. view that the consultations are premature.
DIDS attorneys claim there is no "significant impact," as re-
quired by Article 17.4, to justify consultations on the provision-
al measures. Perhaps if the bounce-balls were cantaloupes that
were perishing at the border, such an impact might exist. But
the mere inconvenience and expense of defending against an
antidumping investigation is not sufficient to justify the ex-
traordinary remedy of review before an investigating authority
has completed its work. The DIDS attorneys add that the
parties' resources, and those of the WTO, will be expended use-
lessly in traveling back and forth to Geneva. This will incur
staff and translation expenses, and will require writing briefs
28. The DSB includes strict time limits for the work of dispute settlement
panels which generally amount to less than a year from panel formation to final
panel decision. See DSU, supra note 2, at arts. 12, 20. In contrast, the Rules of
the CIT, following the Rules of Civil Procedure for the U.S. district courts, provide
that the court may grant a temporary restraining order virtually immediately, ex
parte, for a period of ten days and may extend it, for good cause, for another ten
days. See 28 U.S.C. § 65 (1994). Preliminary injunctions are set for hearing and
heard as soon thereafter as possible. Id.
29. The United States takes the position that WTO panels may only effect
prospective relief, and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act so provides. See discus-
sion infra Part V (regarding implementation of WTO decision against DIDS).
30. See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 19(1); AD, supra note 3, at art. 17.4. See
also discussion infra Part V (regarding implementation of WTO decision against
DIDS).
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and holding arguments when the final determination may be
challenged just a few months in the future. If this were not so,
then the WTO drafters' inclusion in Article 17.4 of the "signifi-
cant impact" requirement would be meaningless, because it
would allow routine challenges to preliminary determinations.
In any event, the Mexican officials proceed to present to
DIDS their views on the merits of the preliminary determina-
tion. Because U.S. law precludes DIDS from re-visiting the
issue of standing following the initiation, 1 the DIDS attor-
neys have nothing more to say on this matter than what they
explained to the CIT at the preliminary injunction hearing.
They likewise have little to say on the merits of the prelimi-
nary antidumping determination because the agency's position
is still tentative.
3. U.S. Soccer Ball Producers
At this point in the investigation, the U.S. soccer ball
producers focus their resources on the continuing success of the
DIDS proceeding. There is little they can do about the
Mexicans' request for WTO consultations, because these talks
occur government-to-government and private parties are not
allowed to participate.32 Nevertheless, they request a short
meeting with DIDS officials prior to the WTO talks." They
will then focus their resources on reviewing documents filed
after the verification conducted by DIDS officials at the Mexi-
can producers' plants to review the accuracy of the information
they have submitted.34 Such verifications are critical to the
decisions made in the final determination.
31. See cases cited supra note 16.
32. See AD, supra note 3. However, while private parties may not participate
as litigants in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, it appears that panels may be
willing to accept amicus briefs from private parties based upon a panel's discre-
tionary authority to accept and consider information and advice submitted to it,
whether requested by a panel or not. See Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 118, para. 108. The U.S. soccer ball
producers keep this possibility in mind, in the event that the case proceeds to a
panel.
33. Such ex parte meetings are allowed in the course of an AD/CVD proceed-
ing. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(a)(3) (1994). In contrast, the Mexican Government's
meeting with DEDS is under the aegis of the WTO consultation provisions, as
discussed above, because the Mexican Government is not an active participant in
the DIDS dumping investigation itself.
34. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(i) (1994).
20011 903
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4. Mexican Government
The Mexican Government proceeds with the WTO consul-
tations with DIDS regarding the preliminary determination;
even though it knows the action is largely pro forma. It will be
certain to file a separate WTO request challenging the final
DIDS determination, assuming it is adverse to the Mexican
bounce-ball producers, in order to preserve all rights regarding
that decision.35
IV. FINAL DETERMINATION
DIDS issues a final affirmative injury and antidumping
determination, with a knock-out dumping margin of 50%.
DIDS continues to define the domestic like product as soccer
balls, because it finds that soccer balls are the domestically
produced product most similar in characteristics and uses with
the imported bounce-balls. However, in the midst of its final
investigation, the international soccer authority, FIFA (Federa-
tion Internationale de Football Association), issues a ruling
that bounce-balls may not be used for regulation matches.
While this information is submitted to DIDS during the inves-
tigation and is therefore on its administrative record, DIDS
does not give it much weight. The agency's decision under the
antidumping law is made according to the statutory require-
ments concerning the definition of domestic like product,
whereas FIFA made its decision in the context of completely
different, sports-related rules. Then, after DIDS has concluded
its investigation, issued its antidumping order, and closed its
administrative record, U.S. soccer authorities, including MLS
(Major League Soccer)-following a long and bitter debate-also
rule that bounce-balls may not be used in regulation games.
35. Mexico's failure to do this resulted in dismissal from the WTO of its chal-
lenge to the final determination by the government of Guatemala in the cement
case. See Appellate Report, supra note 11.
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A. After the Final Determination, What Do the Litigants Do, If
Anything, In What Forum, and Why?
1. Mexican Bounce-Ball Producers
The Mexican bounce-ball producers first consider whether
to challenge DIDS' determination in the CIT3 or before a
NAFTA binational panel." The NAFTA specifies that "each
party shall replace judicial review of final antidumping...
duty determinations with binational panel review.... 3 8 The
law governing binational panel reviews is the national law of
the country in which the review takes place, specifically "the
relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations, administra-
tive practice, and judicial precedents to the extent that a court
of the importing party would rely on such materials in review-
ing a final determination of the competent investigating au-
thority."9 Thus, a request by either the domestic industry or
the Mexican bounce-ball producers to initiate binational panel
review will supersede and replace litigation initiated in the
CIT.4
0
Because the applicable AD/CVD law in a NAFTA panel
proceeding is the law of the importing country, the nature of
the claims that can be brought before a NAFTA panel and the
CIT are generally the same.41 Nevertheless, the Mexican
bounce-ball producers consider differences between the two
fora before selecting the one in which to seek relief. The first
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1994) provides that "the Court of International Trade
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced under section 516A
of the Tariff Act of 1930." 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1994) provides that an interested
party may challenge any final affirmative antidumping determinations by the ad-
ministering authority and by the Commission under 19 U.S.C. § 1673(d) (1994).
37. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g) (1994) (providing that final antidumping determi-
nations regarding merchandise from a NAFTA country may be challenged before a
binational panel if such review is requested pursuant to Article 1904 of the
NAFTA). If such request is made, the determination is not reviewable by the CIT.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(2) (1994).
38. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1904.1.
39. Id. at art. 1904.2.
40. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(2) (1994) (providing that an anti-dumping duty
determination is not reviewable by the CIT if a binational panel review is re-
quested pursuant to Article 1904 of the NAFTA).
41. An exception exists for constitutional issues, however, under U.S. law. See
19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(g)(3), (4) (1994) (setting forth the exception to exclusive bina-
tional panel review for constitutional issues, and, listing other, technical exceptions
to exclusive binational panel review).
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involves the speed of the process." With regard to the NAFTA
panels, Article 1904.14 states that "[tihe rules shall be de-
signed to result in final decisions within 315 days of the date
on which a request for a panel is made .... However, de-
lays in formation of some panels, and problems arising when
panelists discover conflicts of interest, have resulted in the
process often falling short of the NAFTA rules' ambitious time-
table. The complexity and number of issues that panels must
consider in certain cases can result in further delay if panels
take more than the ninety days contemplated for issuing a
decision." By contrast, the CIT, as an Article III court, does
not have specific deadlines for completing litigation. While
some CIT litigation may be concluded within a year of its initi-
ation by the filing of a complaint, most cases will take over a
year, and sometimes several years if appeals are involved. In
sum, the Mexican producers conclude that, as between the two
fora, timing is not a determinative factor.
Another consideration for the bounce-ball producers in
selecting a forum is the status of the decision issued by each
forum. Both CIT and binational panel decisions are binding
upon the parties with respect to the matter being litigated."
However, the different appellate processes in CIT and panel
proceedings serve to distinguish the status of decisions issued
in each forum. In the U.S. courts, all parties, as a matter of
right, may appeal a CIT decision to the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.46 A CIT decision that is not appealed is
binding in the matter being litigated and generally will attain
the status of binding authority in subsequent Department of
Commerce matters."
42. Cost is not a concern, because the expenses of running both the CIT and
the NAFTA are borne by governments. That is, private parties do not choose and
"hire" NAFTA panelists as in the case of private arbitration. Attorneys fees and
related expenses to litigate in either the CIT or the NAFTA would not differ ap-
preciably.
43. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1904.14.
44. See id. See also James R. Holbein, NAFTA Chapter 19: The U.S.
Secretariat's Perspective, in THE COmimERcE DEPARTMIENT SPEAKS ON INTERNATION-
AL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 769 (Practising Law Institute 1998). The paper also
mentions funding problems which, in some cases, have delayed panels. Id.
45. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1904.8 (stating that "[tihe decision of a
panel . . . shall be binding on the involved Parties with respect to the particular
matter between the Parties that is before the panel.").
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 2645 (1994).
47. If the Department of Commerce does not appeal a CIT decision, it nor-
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By contrast, the NAFTA Chapter 19 dispute settlement
procedures contain much more limited opportunity for parties
to appeal panel decisions to an Extraordinary Challenge Com-
mittee ("ECC") comprised of three judges from the member
countries.48 Under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement,
the precursor to the NAFTA, there were only three appeals to
an Extraordinary Challenge Committee, while only one appeal
thus far has been initiated under the NAFTA.49
This limited avenue for appealing a panel decision means
that, as a practical matter, all parties must live with the
panel's decision. Moreover, the panel's decision does not consti-
tute binding precedent upon future DIDS determinations.
Despite these distinctions between the status of the opinions in
the two fora, there are several reasons why the bounce-ball
producers should give this issue only limited weight. First, the
pre-initiation publication and like-product issues are unique to
investigations and would not be relevant in subsequent admin-
istrative reviews of the antidumping duty order. Thus, the
bounce-ball producers can be satisfied that a panel decision
which reverses the DIDS determination would be binding on
this matter and the producers would not have to relitigate
these issues every year to achieve their desired results. More-
over, even if the issues were relevant and DIDS continued to
decide the matter in the same way, the producers could still
refer subsequent panels to the original panel decision as per-
suasive authority.
mally acquiesces to the court's holding and applies it in subsequent Commerce
proceedings. If Commerce or another party appeals a CIT decision, the resulting
Federal Circuit decision is binding on all subsequent Commerce proceedings.
48. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 19.
49. A NAFTA government may challenge a panel decision before an ECC
where:
(a)(1) a member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or a
serious conflict of interest, or otherwise materially violated the rules of
conduct;
(2) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure; or
(3) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction . ..
for example by failing to apply the appropriate standard of review, and
(b) any of the actions set out in subparagraph (a) has materially affected
the panel's decision and threatens the integrity of the binational panel
review process .. .
NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1904.13. One ECC case is pending under NAFTA.
Gray Portland Cement and Clinker from Mexico, ECC-2000-1904-01USA.
20011 907
BROOK. J. INTL L.
An additional element in selecting a forum may be the
individuals that will be reviewing the DIDS determination. In
the CIT, a U.S. judge that is trained and well-versed in U.S.
antidumping law will be reviewing the DIDS determination. If
the Mexican bounce-ball producers request binational panel re-
view, a panel of five individuals will review the challenged
determination. Depending on the case, the panel will be com-
posed of either three Mexican nationals and two U.S. nation-
als, or vice-versa. These panelists will be selected from a roster
of academics, former judges, and private-sector attorneys who
bring to the process their individual political, legal, and eco-
nomic backgrounds. 0 In this regard, Mexican respondents
may find it comforting to litigate their claims before Mexican
nationals who are familiar with the commercial and legal envi-
ronment in which Mexican business operates.
Based upon the above considerations, the Mexican bounce-
ball producers decide to litigate their claims before a binational
panel under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA. The U.S. soccer ball
industry is then compelled to seek any claims that it may have
in the panel proceeding. Thus, even if the domestic industry
wished to litigate any matters in the CIT, the U.S.
antidumping law makes clear that the entire matter, once a
panel request is made, will be litigated in the binational panel
forum.5 The Mexican producers also decide to urge their gov-
ernment to bring the case in the WTO.
2. Mexican Government
The Mexican bounce-ball producers' appeal to their govern-
ment to pursue their case in the WTO raises issues of both law
and policy for the government and, in particular, SECOFI.
SECOFI first considers the legal issues upon which DIDS
might be vulnerable in the WTO. These are considered in the
context of the relevant AD Agreement provisions, rather than
U.S. law.52 As noted above, there are at least two issues
50. See NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex 1901.2.
51. See supra note 37. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g) (1994).
52. The DSU governs dispute settlement proceedings in the WTO. Article 1 of
the DSU applies "to disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute
settlement provisions of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this Under-
standing (referred to in this Understanding as the 'covered agreements')." DSU,
supra note 2, at art. 1. Identified as a multilateral agreement on trade in goods,
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which could be subject to attack. First, the publication of the
bounce-ball petition prior to initiating an investigation may
violate Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement.53 Second, the DIDS
determination that bounce-balls and soccer balls constitute a
single like product for initiation and injury purposes may vio-
late Article 2.6 of the AD Agreement.54 Based upon the plain
language of those provisions, as well as the apparent inconsis-
tency of DIDS' actions with those provisions, Mexico could
argue that the DIDS determination was inconsistent with U.S.
obligations under the AD Agreement. Thus, based upon legal
considerations, the Mexican government decides to pursue
WTO dispute settlement by requesting consultations on the
matter with the U.S. government. Should consultations fail to
cure the alleged deficiencies, Mexico could request to present
its arguments before a three-person panel.55
However, in deciding to go ahead in the WTO, the Mexican
government also remains mindful of a strategic point. Because
interested parties must request CIT or panel review of a Com-
merce determination within 30 days,56 the Mexican govern-
ment will know whether the bounce-ball producers are seeking
relief in one of those fora prior to the time when the Mexican
government likely would begin initiating WTO dispute settle-
ment proceedings. It is conceivable that upon examining the
bounce-ball producers' claims, SECOFI may conclude that the
producers have a better chance of achieving relief privately
the AD Agreement is a "covered agreement" and subject to the rules of the DSU.
See id. at art. 17.1 (stating that "the [DSU] is applicable to consultations and the
settlement of disputes under this Agreement.").
53. See AD, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
54. Id.
55. In the hypothetical, Mexico already has requested consultations upon the
issuance of the DIDS preliminary determination. Any panel that is formed is re-
quired to review only the matter which was the subject of the consultations which
preceded the panel request. The "matter" consists of the measure imposed by the
responding government and the legal basis for challenging that measure. See
Appellate Report, supra note 11, para. 72. The Appellate Body has clarified that
the measures which can be the subject of dispute settlement proceedings under
the AD Agreement include a provisional measure, a price undertaking, or a final
dumping duty. See id. para. 79. While the consultations following the preliminary
determination involved the provisional measure, the subject of dispute settlement
proceedings at this stage would involve the final determination. Since the final
determination is a separate measure, a new set of consultations would be required
before Mexico can request a panel.
56. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(1)(B-D), (2)(A) (1994).
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than the government would in WTO panel proceedings. For
example, even if the government successfully challenged the
DIDS determination before a WTO panel, it is uncertain
whether revocation of the antidumping duty order on bounce-
balls would be achieved.57
As noted above, political issues also may influence a
government's decision to bring a WTO case. For example, gov-
ernment officials must be cognizant of the implications of an
adopted panel report on their own practices. Whether or not a
measure is successfully challenged, the report may contain
legal interpretations and other language that may impact the
complaining government's ability to retain certain practices or
procedures of its own. For example, a panel decision on the
like product determination by DIDS may affect how SECOFI
can examine the existence of a domestic industry and like
product issues in its own cases. If SECOFI is concerned about
the WTO-consistency of its own practices, it may not want to
highlight those issues in dispute settlement proceedings.
Another non-legal consideration may be the limited re-
sources of each government that can be dedicated to WTO
dispute settlement proceedings. Each WTO member has cer-
tain constraints in the amount of resources that can be ex-
pended in such activity. Where resources are so limited, the
government must determine which cases are of the highest
priority. Prioritizing such cases may involve both legal and
political considerations that are unique to each country and
case.
Nevertheless, after analyzing all of these legal and non-
legal factors, and for purposes of our hypothetical, the Mexican
Government decides to file a request for consultations and,
subsequently, a panel regarding the DIDS final determination
on bounce-balls.
V. PosT-LITIGATION
The Mexican bounce-ball producers pursue their case be-
fore a NAFTA panel, while the Mexican Government pursues
the case in the WTO. The WTO rules first, handing Mexico a
big victory. It rules against DIDS on the like product issue
relying heavily on both the FIFA ruling regarding bounce-balls
57. See infra Part V (discussing the results of WTO litigation).
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as well as the post-investigation ruling of the U.S. soccer au-
thorities that bounce-balls may not be used in regulation
matches. The WTO panel also rules that DIDS' violation of the
Antidumping Agreement's no-publication rule renders the
initiation illegal. However, the Mexican bounce-ball industry
also has challenged DIDS' antidumping order before a NAFTA
panel which refuses to consider the post-investigation soccer
ruling and affirms the agency's finding that the like product
determination was reasonable, as well as finding the ads in the
newspapers did not violate any U.S. statute or regulation.
Meanwhile, DIDS appeals its loss to the WTO Appellate Body
and wins as to the panel's reliance upon the post-investigation,
extra-record evidence regarding the U.S. soccer authorities' rul-
ing. However, the Appellate Body affirms the panel on both the
like product and pre-initiation publication issues, thus, in
effect, affirming DIDS' loss.
A. After the WTO and NAFTA Litigation, What Do the
Litigants Do, If Anything, In What Forum, and Why?
1. Mexican Bounce-ball Producers
The bounce-ball producers are delighted with their
government's WTO victory and concerned with preserving and
obtaining implementation of it as soon as possible. They as-
sume that, in accordance with the ruling, DIDS will revoke the
AD order on their product and refund any cash deposits and
release any bonds. However, their attorneys advise them that
this may not occur, because WTO panel rulings are implement-
ed prospectively, as discussed below.
2. U.S. Soccer Ball Producers
Soccer ball producers are delighted with their NAFTA
victory and concerned that the WTO ruling against the DIDS
final determination not undercut the continuation of the AD
order in any way. They convey their views to DIDS and to the
U.S. Congress.
3. Mexican Government
The Mexican government is both pleased with its WTO
victory and concerned that the obligations of NAFTA under
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Chapter 19 be respected and maintained. Mindful of both these
goals, it listens to its domestic bounce-ball producers and keeps
informed of DIDS' actions, including its statutory obligations,
as discussed below.
4. DIDS
DIDS must consider that the WTO panel, affirmed by the
Appellate Body, has ruled that DIDS' final AD determination
was inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the AD Agree-
ment and that the U.S. must "bring its measures into confor-
mity"8 with those obligations. Further, the NAFTA binational
panel affirmed the lawfulness under U.S. law of the DIDS
determination. DIDS attorneys review the provisions contained
in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) dedicated to
the implementation of adverse WTO rulings.59
The URAA details how the ITC and Commerce would
implement adverse panel reports. Because DIDS acts as both
the ITC and Commerce in the hypothetical, the DIDS officials
have to consider the provisions relevant to the implementation
process in both agencies.
Where a panel report implicates an ITC or Commerce
determination, the agency must consult with the Office of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) as well as the
appropriate congressional committees (i.e., Senate Finance and
House Ways and Means)." These consultations are intended
to assist the USTR in evaluating the panel's findings and the
development of implementing action, if any.6 While Com-
merce proceedings likely involve oral consultations, the ITC,
upon request of the USTR, may issue an advisory report on
whether U.S. trade laws permit ITC action implementing the
panel's findings." Based upon this advisory report, the USTR
58. DSU, supra note 2, at art. 19.1.
59. See 19 U.S.C. § 3538 (1994).
60. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 3538(a)(1), (b)(1) (1994).
61. See SAA, supra note 6, at 356. Specifically, consultations are intended to
provide the USTR with advice on whether implementation is permissible under the
U.S. antidumping or countervailing duty law, the implications for the administra-
tion of the trade laws upon implementing the findings, and the most desirable
method of implementing the findings and the time required to do so. See id.
62. See 19 U.S.C. § 3538(a)(1) (1994). This advisory report is not subject to
judicial review. See SAA, supra note 6, at 354. The URAA provisions relevant to
Commerce's implementation of adverse panel reports do not contemplate the issu-
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will determine whether to appeal a panel report, whether to
implement an adverse report, and estimate how long an imple-
mentation period may be required.
After consultations with DIDS and the congressional com-
mittees, the USTR determines that issuing a redetermination
would be consistent with existing U.S. law. Therefore, the
USTR requests that DIDS issue a determination in connection
with the bounce-ball proceeding that would render the DIDS
action not inconsistent with the findings of the panel or the
Appellate Body. DIDS must do this within the applicable stat-
utory deadlines."
In issuing a new determination, DIDS proceeds to recon-
sider the U.S. soccer ball producers' petition without publish-
ing anything in Soccer America or soliciting public comment
prior to initiation. In addition, DIDS re-examines the question
of industry support by analyzing anew the like product issue in
a manner consistent with the panel's and Appellate Body's
interpretation of the like product provision in Article 2 of the
AD Agreement. DIDS concludes that soccer balls are not suffi-
ciently similar in characteristics and uses with the imported
bounce-balls to support a finding that the U.S. industry pro-
ducing soccer balls has the requisite industry support to bring
a case against the Mexican bounce-ball producers." DIDS
therefore issues a negative initiation redetermination, suggest-
ing that the antidumping duty investigation should not have
been conducted and the order should not have been imposed.
Once DIDS issues a redetermination, the USTR and DIDS
must again consult with the appropriate congressional commit-
tees prior to deciding whether to implement the new deter-
mination." Whether the USTR directs DIDS to implement its
redetermination will be dictated by the issues contained in the
ance of an advisory report. Instead, Commerce, after consultations with and a
written request by the USTR, shall issue a determination that is not inconsistent
with the Panel's findings. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 3538(b)(1), (b)(2) (1994).
63. With respect to ITC determinations, the ITC has 120 days from the date
of USTR's request to issue a redetermination. See 19 U.S.C. § 3538(a)(4) (1994).
Commerce has 180 days from the date of USTR's request to issue a redetermina-
tion. See 19 U.S.C. § 3538(b)(2) (1994).
64. The conclusion of the hypothetical DIDS does not implicate what a real-
world Commerce Department might conclude in such an unusual instance, after
consultation with the ITC about its long-established domestic like product practice.
65. See 19 U.S.C. § 3538(a)(5) (1994) (ITC consultations). See also 19 U.S.C. §
3538(b)(3) (1994) (Commerce consultations).
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redetermination. The URAA provides that a redetermination
will not be implemented (i.e., have effect under domestic law) if
it reaches the same conclusion that was part of the initial
determination.66 By contrast, a redetermination that results
in changes in the initial determination will require implemen-
tation. If implementation is required, DIDS must publish no-
tice of implementation in the Federal Register.67
Based upon DIDS' determination that soccer balls and
bounce-balls are two, separate, like products and that, based
upon this decision, the petition was not filed by or on behalf of
an industry that has been injured by reason of imports, the
USTR directs DIDS to implement its redetermination." Con-
sequently, DIDS .publishes its determination and intention to
revoke the antidumping duty order on bounce-balls from Mexi-
co in the Federal Register.69 Importantly, this redetermination
is subject to judicial review.7 °
DIDS' revocation of the antidumping duty order appears to
be at odds with the results of the binational panel proceedings
in which a panel determined that the DIDS determination was
based upon substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance
with law. However, it appears that Congress contemplated
such conflict when promulgating the URAA. The Statement of
Administrative Action ("SAA7) suggests that DIDS may imple-
ment a redetermination pursuant to the USTR's request even
if litigation is pending with respect to the initial agency deter-
66. See SAA, supra note 6, at 356. The SAA provides the example of Com-
merce analyzing the countervailability of a subsidy program. If, based on the
panel's findings, Commerce corrects the analytical flaw but reaches the same,
affirmative conclusion as to that subsidy program, implementation would not be
necessary. Id.
67. See 19 U.S.C. § 3538(c)(2)(A) (1994).
68. See 19 U.S.C. § 3538(b)(4) (1994) (The USTR may direct Commerce to
implement its redetermination). See also 19 U.S.C. § 3538(a)(6) (1994) (stating that
if, based upon a redetermination, an antidumping or countervailing duty order is
no longer supported by an affirmative injury determination, then the USTR may
direct Commerce to revoke the order in whole or in part).
69. See 19 U.S.C. § 3538(c)(2) (1994) (stating that the Department of Com-
merce "shall publish in the Federal Register notice of the implementation of any
determination made under this section with respect to Title VII of the Tariff Act
of 1930.").
70. See 19 U.S.C. § 3538(e) (1994) (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1984) (pro-
viding review by the courts and the NAFTA binational panels of new Title VII
determinations made by Commerce or the ITC under 19 U.S.C. § 3538 that are
implemented).
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rination.' Indeed, the SAA addresses this issue directly by
discussing the implications of simultaneously litigating an
initial agency determination and a redetermination pursuant
to an adverse panel report:
Because implemented determinations under [19 U.S.C. §
3538] may be appealed, it is possible that Commerce or the
ITC may be in the position of simultaneously defending de-
terminations in which the agency reached different conclu-
sions. In such situations, the Administration expects that
courts and binational panels will be sensitive to the fact that
under the applicable standard of review, as set forth in stat-
ute and case law, multiple permissible interpretations of the
law and the facts may be legally permissible in any particu-
lar case, and the issuance of a different determination under
section 129 does not signify that the initial determination
was unlawful. 2
Thus, DIDS recognizes that the binational panel may affirm
the DIDS determination while a second binational panel or the
CIT may affirm the redetermination which results in revoking
the antidumping duty order.
DIDS officials also consider the implications of the above
actions on the assessment of antidumping duties. However,
publishing an antidumping duty order does not result in the
immediate assessment of antidumping duties on entries of
subject merchandise. Specifically, antidumping or countervail-
ing duties on entries subject to Commerce's and ITC's inves-
tigations are not assessed until the completion of an adminis-
trative review which typically begins one year following the
investigation and is not concluded until another year after its
initiation.73 Thus, the inconsistent outcomes of the WTO and
binational panel proceedings will not have an impact on the
assessment of duties in the DIDS hypothetical. '4
71. See SAA, supra note 6, at 356.
72. Id. at 358.
73. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1994).
74. The SAA makes clear that the redeterminations pursuant to an adverse
WTO panel report have prospective effect only:
[Redeterminations] apply to unliquidated entries of merchandise entered,
or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the date on
which the Trade Representative directs implementation. Thus, relief avail-
able under [19 U.S.C. § 3538] is distinguishable from relief available in
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VI. CONCLUSION
The hypothetical could continue with varying out-
comes-some that can be imagined and others beyond the imag-
ination. For example, it is conceivable that the United States
could decline to implement an adverse WTO panel ruling and
address the compensation and retaliation provisions of the
DSU 5 Nevertheless, the hypothetical demonstrates the com-
plexity which litigation of antidumping and countervailing
duty determinations may present in various national and in-
ternational fora. Doubtless the real-world versions of the "Jy-
po" will be-and, in fact, are being-played out in national inves-
tigating agencies, courts, and international fora in an increas-
ingly interesting way. Ideally, this litigation will, in the long
run, foster freer and fairer trade and more open markets
around the world.
an action brought before a court or a NAFTA binational panel, where,
depending on the circumstances of the case, retroactive relief may be
available.
SAA, supra note 6, at 357.
75. See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 21 (concerning implementation of panel
rulings and procedures for resolving disputes regarding implementation). See also
id. at art. 22 (concerning compensation and the suspension of concessions if imple-
mentation does not occur within a reasonable period of time, including the possi-
bility of arbitration).
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